



A MUST READ



Endeley



Foncha



Jua



Muna



Ayuk



Sako
Current

Breaking News

The Truth at Last

Bilingue

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1st October 1961 – 1st October 2026

65 YEARS OF SERVITUDE



Paul Biya, Buea,
February 20, 2014

"History has not forgotten that Buea was the Capital of the Southern Cameroons"

Why Foncha Resigned ...

"Mr. Ahidjo publicly stated to the people of southern Cameroons during successive visits to that territory in 1960 and 1961 that unification would not mean annexation, that its modalities would be negotiated between representatives of Southern Cameroons and those of La République du Cameroun and that to render unification viable and useful; a flexible and federal form of the state which he qualified as unique and diverse, was envisaged...

I can state here and now that the People of southern Cameroons would never have voted in favour of unification if it had not been for the assurances given that the resulting union would take the form of a federation...

The hounourable S. T. Muna and I have often been accused of having allowed this situation [i.e. Annexation of Southern Cameroons'] to come about.)

"La République du Cameroun (LRC) did not conquer us in a war. The truth remains that we did not force ourselves upon them either. They promised to respect our sovereign choice to stay or opt out. Ahidjo famously said this in 1961 at the UN: 'The Southern Cameroons(SC) will keep it's own administration, it's own parliament, and it's own laws...We have promised and we solemnly reaffirm that the institutions of the SC will be respected.'... Instead of keeping their word, Mr Biya recently told us, they sought to annex us, erase our identity and transform the union of equals to a conquest."

~President Samuel Sako



"Uniting the Southern Cameroons to the Cameroun République is like forcing a balloon under the sea. One day, it will come out"

Dag Hammarskjöld
(U.N. Secretary General),
1953-1961

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Why Foncha, Muna and 5 Other Southern Cameroonians Withdrew from The Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reforms.

On the 4th of Dec 1994, Paul Biya signed a decree creating the Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reforms. The committee was headed by Achidi Achu to window-dress it as being controlled by an Anglophone. Of the 58 members of the committee, only 14 were Southern Cameroonians. 7 out of the 14 later withdrew from the deliberation process in committee. Among them are Pa Foncha and Muna. It should be borne in mind that the 1996 constitution of the Republic was born out of this charade. The unbalanced representation and failure to address the Southern Cameroons question compelled FONCHA, MUNA and five others to withdraw.

An Excerpt of what Foncha wrote in his withdrawal letter

"Mr. Ahidjo publicly stated to the people of Southern Cameroons during successive visits to that territory in 1960 and 1961 that unification would not mean annexation, that its modalities would be negotiated between representatives of Southern Cameroons and those of La République du Cameroun and that to render unification viable and useful, a flexible and federal form of the state which he qualified as unique and diverse, was envisaged...

I can state here and now that the People of southern Cameroons would never have voted in favour of unification if it had not been for the assurances given that the resulting union would take the form of a federation...

The honourable S. T. Muna and I have often been accused of having allowed this situation {i.e., 'annexation of Southern Cameroons'} to come about. At this point I do not feel the necessity—nor, I suppose, does the Honourable S. T. Muna—to defend myself against these accusations, unjust though they are. What is important is that the Good Lord who, in his infinite wisdom, determines the affairs of each man and of each people, has preserved me long enough to have the opportunity of pleading before the Cameroon Nation for the



"Uniting the Southern Cameroons to the Cameroun République is like forcing a balloon under the sea. One day, it will come out"

Dag Hammarskjöld
(U.N. Secretary General),
1953-1961

correction of the wrongs which have been done, over the past three decades and more, against an unsuspecting and trusting people that I, acting in good faith and as a Cameroonian patriot, led into what I was assured would be a union of equal partners, but which has since turned out to be an arrangement for the annexation, subjugation and domination of one of the partners by the other...I responded to the invitation of the President of the Republic to attend this Committee in the confident expectation that the deliberations of the Committee would offer us the opportunity to correct the wrongs which I have referred to above.

For nearly two years, the people of Southern Cameroons whom I led into the union with La République du Cameroun have, through the All-Anglophone Conference- AAC (now the Southern Cameroons People's Conference-SCPC) carefully studied, responsibly formulated, and respectfully submitted to government, substantial constitutional proposals. These proposals are aimed at ensuring better governance of the entire united Cameroon, while also putting an end to the annexation, subjugation and domination of one of our two territories by the other, thus restoring the spirit and intent of the union of 1961...

In any event, in the proposals that have been submitted before us, I do not see any provisions at all which go in the direction of making

even a token attempt to respond to the grievances of the Southern Cameroonian People...

Mr. chairman,
In the final analysis, the people of Southern Cameroons never participated in the elaboration and adoption of the supposed federal constitution of 1961 which was adopted by the National Assembly of La République du Cameroun on September 1, 1961, that is to say, one month before the birth of the federal Republic of Cameroon. These same people never participated in drawing up the unitary constitution of 1972, which was imposed upon them in a nationwide referendum. Bearing this in mind, I had hoped that the present constitutional reform process would provide the people of Southern Cameroons the opportunity, for the first time since independence of our respective territories and the reunification of our fatherland, to contribute effectively to the elaboration and adoption of a truly Cameroonian constitution which responds to their aspirations as well...

I feel distressed that the constitutional proposals put before this committee do not offer the opportunity for us, as a nation, to address our minds to, and resolve, the genuine and legitimate grievances of the Southern Cameroonian people in particular and the Cameroonian people in general.

I feel all the more distressed that this should be happening under the chairmanship of a son of Southern Cameroons whom, I believe, is as sensitive as any one of us to the injustices which his People and their Territory have suffered in more than three decades. Today, he has been designated to preside over the completion of the process of annexation of that People and that Territory.

For this, He shall tomorrow stand accused by his People, as I stand accused today. However, whereas in 1961 the bitter experiences of Southern Cameroons lay in the future that we could not predict, in 1994 we have behind us thirty-three years' worth of these experiences, with the prospect of more to come

unless something is done now. In the light of these experiences, we have no reason in 1994 to repeat the mistakes of 1961"



Dr. John Ngu Foncha

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Cameroun: Le vivre-ensemble à problème

Il faut réparer cette escroquerie historique et revenir dans une république consensuelle, acceptée de tout le monde dans laquelle l'identité anglophone est reconnue au même titre que la dignité francophone

Les anglophones, avec leurs revendications corporatistes qui ont commencé, nous ont dit une chose. En toile de fond. Ils nous ont dit, on a été bernés depuis 61.

On ne veut plus vivre dans ce modèle-là. C'est ce qu'ils nous ont dit. Et c'est la raison pour laquelle le conflit ne fait que s'angliser.

Parce que ceux qui tiennent les leviers de pouvoir, aujourd'hui, ne sont pas capables d'aborder ces problématiques et de les résoudre. Par contre, celui qui a reçu le suffrage des Camerounais et qui a la légitimité populaire au Cameroun, nous a toujours dit qu'il est un mandataire de la paix. Par exemple, Paul Biya.

Nous a toujours dit qu'il est un mandiant de la paix. Et votre étonnement peut être beaucoup plus grand. On ne peut pas être un mandiant de la paix et chez soi, ne pas asseoir un minimum de processus qui mène à la paix dans les deux régions importantes du nord-ouest et du sud-ouest.

Donc le problème est simple. Les anglophones nous ont dit nous, on ne vit plus avec vous comme nous sommes en train de vivre. Parce que, toutes les frustrations que nous avons subies depuis la création de l'État unitaire, nous ne nous retrouvons pas dans ce système.

Mon grand frère, Robert, a égrené un ensemble de problématiques sur lesquelles je ne vais pas revenir, mais ce sont des problématiques qui sont vraies. Les anglophones nous ont dit qu'on ne fonctionne plus comme ça. Maintenant, c'est à nous, obteneurs du pouvoir central, parce qu'il a aussi dit quelque chose d'important, dans ce camp, il y a des faucons de la guerre qui estiment que la guerre doit continuer, qu'on doit vaincre à tout prix et en payant tous les prix.

Et en payant tous les prix, c'est les 6500 morts qui sont le prix le plus élevé. Parce que tout ce qui a été



détruit là-bas, comme bien matériel, ne vaut pas les 6500 morts que le Cameroun compte déjà dans son escarcelle. Alors là maintenant, il est logique, il est impératif que le sommet de l'état du Cameroun règle ce problème. Dans ce sens qu'on comprend que dans d'autres camps, il y a des gens qui veulent que la guerre ne s'arrête pas. Mais il faut que la guerre s'arrête. Desiré a dit, il vaut mieux qu'on négocie un compromis.

Moi, j'ai même une compromission qu'il faut négocier. Mais il faut qu'on sache une chose, le compromis est boité. Quand on va au compromis, dès lors qu'on accepte d'aller au compromis, ça veut dire qu'on n'est pas suffisant.

Si on est suffisant, on reste chez soi, sans s'adresser aux autres. Mais si on accepte de s'asseoir sur une table, d'aller au compromis, tout le problème est sur la table. Qu'il n'y ait pas de problème exclu.

Parce que c'est sur le problème exclu que les anglophones appuient. Ils disent... Moi, je suis né en République fédérale du Cameroun. Mon acte de naissance est claire.

République fédérale, moi. Ça veut dire que c'est un système qui a été expérimenté dans ces pays pendant 11 ans et qui a donné... Aujourd'hui, nous avons encore la réminiscence et le regret de l'avoir quitté. Ce que l'aîné disait tout à l'heure, le sous-système de la fiscalité locale, de l'eau, tout ce qui s'est passé dans les zones anglophones ne se passait pas

chez nous.

Le système judiciaire... Moi, j'ai vécu dans un pays anglo-saxon. Le système de bail-out est un système systématique et ça découle de l'Habeas corpus. Que tu aies ton compte.

Donc, il y a des contraintes. Et puis, c'est consubstantiel à l'existence de la partie anglophone du Cameroun qui n'a pas la même éducation. Duval, Madarène Mead disait que la culture est un ensemble de données et qu'on acquise un double individu unis par une même tradition et transmise par l'éducation.

On n'a pas la même éducation. On n'a pas les mêmes valeurs. Alors, ceux qui sont en face de nous... Mais nous sommes dans la même république.

On s'est dit qu'on allait dans la chose, la république, la république... Mais là-dedans, il faut que chacun soit respecté avec ses valeurs, avec ce qu'il a. Mais nous, on a imposé... Avec son identité. Mais nous, on a imposé jusqu'au complexe d'infériorité aux anglophones. Quand on vous dit que vous n'êtes pas bien, dans notre jargon, ça veut dire que vous êtes quelqu'un dont la compréhension est très étriquée.

Peut-être qu'il faut dire le régime. Le régime, oui. Bien sûr.

C'est des choses qu'il faut extirper. C'est des choses qu'il faut sortir. Et en plus, Duval, dans les relations que le pouvoir a entretenues depuis 1961, ceux qui ont fait les accords disent que tout ce qui avait été mis dans les accords n'a

jamais été respecté.

Je prends seulement un cas simple. La découverte du pétrole du Cap Limbo a précipité la création de l'état unitaire. Parce que quand nous étions dans un état fédéral, les experts françaises pensaient que comme le pétrole est découvert au Cap Limbo, s'il est laissé à la gestion des anglophones, ils ne pourront pas avoir la contrepartie.

C'est la raison pour laquelle, de manière mesquine et malhonnête, nous avons poussé à faire l'état unitaire pour que le pétrole ne nous échoie dans sa gestion. Mais la question lancéante qu'il faut se poser est que depuis que le pétrole est découvert au Cap Limbo, aucun anglophone ne l'a jamais géré. Aucun anglophone ne l'a jamais géré.

Nous, les araignabes, nous l'avons géré deux fois. Avec l'ancien ex-DG Éding Bernard et Metouk Charles. Deux fois.

Les anglophones n'ont jamais géré la ressource qui est sous leurs pieds. Et quand ils vous disent des choses comme ça, même si ce n'est pas de façon la plus audible, mais il est quand même logique qu'on le sache et qu'on dise quel est le statut qu'on va faire. La spécificité que le grand frère fait n'est pas la paix de tous ses vœux et que désiré, comme ça s'est dit tout à l'heure, et que dans un cadre réglementaire, inclusif, total, qu'on se parle les yeux dans les yeux et qu'on reconnaisse d'abord que les autres, on a fait un don.

C'est-à-dire que cet arrangement qui a été fait a des effets de logique. Il faut réparer cette escroquerie historique et revenir dans une république consensuelle, acceptée de tout le monde dans laquelle l'identité anglophone est reconnue au même titre que la dignité francophone.

@breakingnews, pris sur Équinoxe

Joseph Owona killed the thought and idea of Federation in 1996. Stop dreaming; see this article.

DO YOU KNOW THAT PROFESSOR JOSEPH OWONA CONTRIBUTED TO WHAT IS TODAY KNOWN AS THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS?

In the early 1990s, Cameroon was under dual pressure: a national demand for multiparty democracy after the end of the one-party system, and a specific Anglophone demand for restoration of the 1961 federal bargain.

Professor Joseph Owona was at the center of the government's constitutional response.

1. The Context of the Engagements • Tripartite Conference 1991:

After the 1990 law on multiparty politics and the "ghost town" general strikes, President Paul Biya organized a tripartite conference - government, opposition parties, civil society - to reform elections and avoid a sovereign national conference. One outcome was a commission to revise the 1972 Unitary Constitution.

• **All Anglophone Conference (AAC):** In response, Anglophone elites organized. AAC I was held in Buea in April 1993 and AAC II in Bamenda in 1994. The Buea Declaration called for a return to federalism. • **The Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters (TCCM):** Biya created the TCCM, chaired by Joseph Owona, then Secretary General at the Presidency and former Minister of Education. The committee is described in academic literature as comprising 7 Francophones and 4 Anglophones.

The 4 Anglophone members were: Benjamin Itoe • Simon Munzu • Sam Ekontang Elad • Carlson Anyangwe They presented a draft proposal for a federal structure.

2. The Position of the Anglophone Elites The Anglophone delegation was not asking for secession at that point. Their documented position was:

1. **Return to Federalism:** Restore the two-

state federation of 1961 as agreed at Foumban - West Cameroon and East Cameroon with autonomous governments. 2.

Protection of Anglophone Identity: Constitutional guarantees for the English common law system, Anglo-Saxon education system including the GCE Board, and local administration.

3. **Decentralized Power:** Limiting presidential appointment powers that had concentrated all decisions in Yaoundé since Ahidjo's 1972 referendum.

3. Professor Joseph Owona's Position and Mandate

Owona was acting on instructions from Biya as head of the government's technical drafting committee. According to International Crisis Group and academic accounts:

"Anglophone groups withdrew from the constitutional review when Joseph Owona, who was representing the government, made clear that Yaoundé would not consider returning to a federation."

Two weeks before the October 1992 presidential elections, Professor Joseph Owona "presented a draft constitution to the Anglophone Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu, which preserved the essential features of the unitary state", making "no concession to the Anglophone members' federalist demands".

Professor Joseph Owona stance was: Federalism was non-negotiable and equated with secessionism

• Cameroon would remain a unitary state, at most "unitary decentralized"

• The president's prerogatives would be preserved and even enhanced - the 1996 Constitution that resulted introduced a 7-year renewable term and extensive appointment powers, which critics call the basis for a life

presidency.

As a result, prominent figures including former West Cameroon Prime Ministers and former Vice-Presidents of the Federal Republic, John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna, resigned from the Consultative Committee in 1994 when it became clear federalism was not on the table.

They then took the Southern Cameroons case to the UN. John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna reminded President Paul Biya that without a union treaty they were going to declare independence of Southern Cameroons.

The draft was debated in parliament in November 1995 and promulgated by Biya on 18 January 1996. It did include Article 62(2) allowing the law to "take into consideration the specificities of certain Regions" - the legal seed for the later Special Status - but in practice retained central control.

4. **The "refused to admit into the hall" story** There is no official state record of Professor Joseph Owona physically locking Anglophone delegates out of a meeting hall. In Anglophone oral history and activist literature, the phrase is used metaphorically to describe procedural exclusion:

Federal proposals were ruled out of order before discussion

• The four Anglophone draft proposals were not integrated into the final Owona draft

• In later CPDM meetings, Professor Joseph Owona is reported to have "stormed out" when constitutional amendment was raised, reinforcing the perception that debate was closed.

For Anglophone delegates, the effect was the same as not being admitted: they were present in the committee, but their core demand was declared inadmissible.



5. How the failure contributed to the Anglophone Crisis

The 1993-96 failure is seen as a critical turning point:

1. **From autonomy to secession:** When federalism was rejected in Yaoundé, movements like the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) shifted from asking for federalism to asking for outright secession.

2. **Legitimacy deficit:** The 1996 Constitution was viewed in the North West and South West as imposed. The decentralization it promised was never funded or implemented - regional councils were never set up, and mayors remained under governors appointed by Yaoundé.

3. **Accumulated grievances:** Lawyers and teachers who led the 2016 strikes cited the same issues debated in 1993 - centralization of courts and schools - as proof that the 1996 framework did not protect them. The government's heavy-handed response to those 2016 protests then triggered the armed conflict that has killed over 6,000 people.

In short, Professor Joseph Owona's committee cemented a centralized unitary model when a window existed for a federal or highly decentralized compromise. Anglophone elites left the process believing institutional reform was impossible, a narrative that later armed groups used to justify separatism.

Prof. Martin Ayim

RECOLONIZATION BY ANNEXATION (1961- 2019)

1961- 2019: 58 years of La République du Cameroun Rule of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia)

1961-1972: An aborted federal constitution in 1961 brought about the change of names. Southern Cameroons became the state of West Cameroon while La République du Cameroun became the state of East Cameroon. Another change of name came in 1972 after a fake referendum. The two states, equal in status, now became known as the United Republic of Cameroon. The year following saw the invasion and systematic destruction of Southern Cameroons until hitherto.

In 1984, there was a unilateral change of the country's name again from the United Republic of Cameroon back to La République du Cameroun, a name it had at independence in 1960.

PLANNED SYSTEMATIC ANNIHILATION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHERN CAMEROONS

The non-respect of Art. 76(b) of the

UN Charter towards self-governance, and not by joining other already independent states.

Absence of any treaty of union between La République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons after the plebiscite of 1961 as two independent states equal in status. Unity was again lost when this document was never signed.

The non-respect of Art. 47 of the then Federal Constitution, which did not allow for the revision of the federal nature of the state.

The total absorption of the Southern Cameroons as Provinces of La République du Cameroun (The North West and South West Provinces) in 1972, now called Regions, changing the name from the Federal Republic of Cameroon to the United Republic of Cameroon.

The unilateral styling of the name back to La République du Cameroun at independence in 1960 by a presidential decree of 1984 is



tantamount to the fact that the two have never become one - The final confining of unity was confirmed ab initio by that decree.

For 58 years (1961 – 2019), all steps have been tailored towards the colonization and annexation of Southern Cameroons, aided unabated.

LASTING PEACE AND JUSTICE SOLUTION

The acknowledgement that

Southern Cameroons has a separate identity.

The international community's acceptance of Southern Cameroons' right to self-determination.

The respect for international boundaries before and at independence in 1960.

The close to 60 years of domination by way of political suppression and repression, economic deprivation,

cultural subjugation and the absence of the rule of law and torture are very evident and systemic. Bad faith having been established over the decades is enough proof that trust has been betrayed severally and therefore parting separate ways will be the best option.

CONCLUSION

The Southern Cameroons problem is a revolt against history and the restoration of statehood from annexation and colonization in the 21st century. There is no Anglophone problem inside La République du Cameroun, but there is a Southern Cameroons problem with La République du Cameroun. Therefore, any form of dialogue organized by any of the belligerents in the absence of an international mediator and not on neutral ground is considered a yellow hammer document in preparation for REAL DIALOGUE.

Wilfred Martens Ndze (2019)

AMBAZONIANS ARE CORRECT TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST LRC by ERIC CHINJE

Understanding the Civil War in Cameroon

"Cameroon is a nation at war!"

For more than five decades between 1961 and 2016, the vast majority of Anglophones in the country wondered, with growing anguish, whether the trajectory of society corresponded to their sense of belonging and their deepest aspirations for independence. Political and economic developments during this period constantly raised opposing arguments. In 1965, the Prime Minister of the State of West Cameroon - the English-speaking half of the country, which had agreed in October 1961 to join former East Cameroon in creating an independent federal republic of two states - was summarily dismissed from his functions and replaced by a person appointed by the federal government in Yaoundé.

Citizens scratched their heads a lot, but political novices in the state capital, Buea, could not really understand what had happened and what the long-term consequences would be.

Some protests were recorded in the independent state press, but the majority in West Cameroon preferred to stay with the federal experience.

In 1972, a referendum was organized to validate the annulment of the federal constitution adopted in Fomuban in 1961 and to establish the United Republic of Cameroon. This was a nationwide consultation in which the citizens of the Federated State of West Cameroon (West Cameroon) were in the minority, and the positive result of this referendum did not necessarily reflect the wishes of the citizens of the State.

Cameroon became a unitary state, but the only unannounced result was an increase in the number of English-speaking Cameroonians who quietly complained about the untenable nature of the experiment.

Again, the silent majority seemed willing to see what a United Republic would look like given the time.

The following decade was marked by a series of educational and economic actions which reinforced the growing sense among Anglophone Cameroonians that they had made the wrong deal and were reduced to second-class citizens.

First, students who qualified for university in Cameroon quickly realized that the choice of English courses at the only university in the country was very limited. Many began to look abroad for further education opportunities, leaving the country with literally no love left for Cameroon.

Those who went to Yaoundé and worked to survive in a very French-speaking

environment quickly remembered the words used to describe them: "anglo-fou"; "Anglo-con"; or quite simply "the Anglos". Resentment has taken root!

Economically, government action further reinforced feelings of rejection and what many saw as growing cultural incompatibility. Revered institutions in West Cameroon were either closed or absorbed by related institutions in East Cameroon, which did not appear to have the same instruments of accountability. These included: the Produce Marketing Board - a structure that was created to ensure that the country's farmers were not victimized by fluctuations in the international commodity market - which was absorbed and ultimately destroyed by the ONCPB;

The Cameroon Bank, which was transferred to Yaoundé and finally closed; the Mobile Wing - a highly disciplined police force that was the crown jewel of the law enforcement system - which was simply disbanded; the Public Works Department, PWD - the unit responsible for ensuring that investments in transport infrastructure are properly maintained - has been transformed and essentially dissolved.

Others were the constitutionally mandated Commission of Inquiry which ensured that state resources were used for the benefit of the state and that no reckless government official with access to the public purse. cannot abuse their office for personal gain; the Cameroon Power Corporation (Powercam) - the energy entity that has grown in a structured and strategic way with the economy - which has been closed and replaced by a system which quickly demonstrated its inability to meet the growing needs of citizens and the economy; vehicle inspection and sanitary inspection units which, respectively, ensured that vehicles circulating in the country are always roadworthy and that public spaces maintain the highest possible hygiene standards. Hospitals and schools needed to function optimally, with teachers and health professionals among the state's most respected professionals.

In these and other sectors, English speakers have seen a decline in the quality of life and public services with growing concern.

In 1982, the first president of the republic resigned from his functions and appointed his prime minister to succeed him to the supreme magistracy.

Some English-speaking citizens had hoped that, in the spirit of the Fomuban accords which produced the federal

constitution, power would pass to an English-speaking. Many were deeply disappointed when that turned out not to be the case, but held their arms to see what the new president would do to get Fomuban back to mind.

Not only did he do nothing about it but, in 1984, without resorting to any form of public consultation, unilaterally declared the end of the unitary state and returned the country to what it was in 1960: the Republic of Cameroon! This decision provided the fertilizer that would energize the latent movement that had always demanded independence for Southern Cameroons - the name of the United Nations Trust Territory which became West Cameroon after the Fomuban Conference. The notion of an independent republic of Ambazonia was born with the announcement of "the Republic of Cameroon".

Its supporters believed that Mr. Biya had withdrawn French-speaking Cameroon from the union, returning it to the entity which had gained its independence from France in 1960. Many members of the movement began to make their arguments to the Union. UN and the African Union now "celebrate" what they see as restoring their country to its pre-1961 status.

The Ambazonians remained a negligible political force that lost momentum again in 1990 when it looked like democracy - which had been on the rise in English-speaking Cameroon before and immediately after independence - would finally arrive in the country.

The rise of the Social Democratic Front, founded by John Fru Ndi with the initial support of the English-speaking elite, seemed to be the panacea for the ills that had settled in national society: endemic corruption, economic stagnation, poor infrastructure. , Degradation of health and education, and an increase in ethnicity and tribalism in politics.

Democracy has not found a democrat in Cameroon! It all turned out to be a mirage, and reality quickly set in, with a slow and steady shift towards one-party rule and the collapse of justice and accountability, two cardinal elements of any democracy.

The start of the second decade of the current millennium came with what appeared to be a determined attempt by the government to assimilate and Francophonize Anglophone Cameroon. The president of the republic seemed to confirm this during what was presented as a peace summit in Paris in November 2019.



Magistrates and teachers, as well as administrators and those responsible for public order with little or no English language proficiency, were deployed in both English-speaking regions. In 2016, the people of both regions felt they were tired of trying to be Cameroonians with full citizenship rights.

Teachers 'and lawyers' unions attempted to engage in talks with the government, but were quickly labelled "terrorists", arrested and jailed. On October 1, 2017, mass protests, with demonstrators wearing "peace plants", were violently suppressed, with some having been shot dead.

This served as the call to action that the Ambazonians needed, and when the Head of State, in November 2017, announced on his arrival in Yaoundé from a summit in Abidjan, the dispatch of the army to settle the uprising in the English-speaking regions, the country entered into civil war!

Thousands of people have died, hundreds of thousands have been displaced both within and in neighboring countries, villages have been razed and, despite Yaoundé's claims to the contrary, the war is over. is nowhere in sight.

Well-informed minds have argued that this is a war for the hearts and minds of English speakers; the army is the wrong instrument to resort to and can never win the war. What seems to be lacking is the political will to recognize it and act on it. Bullets pierce the heart; they do not win it. Someone in authority should take note! "

My comment: he wanted to be succinct. But that's enough to understand the English-speaking problem. Certain moderates of the NOSO will never say it officially, but the Ambazonians were right to bear arms against the Biya system, especially after this system raped, assaulted and killed many peaceful protesters in October 2016 and October 2017.

Remembering September 22, 2017

10 years of resilience, peace plants held high, blue and white everywhere, and that unshaken hope of being FREE AT LAST. Indeed — from that first peaceful stand with peace plants 10 years ago to this huge crowd still holding hope, we made a powerful piece of history.

Cameroun: "Tous les Anglophones sont dehors" was the description of a French Cameroonian journalist.

22nd September 2017. The test for freedom. We don't need a referendum. This day speaks for itself. This day showed Yaounde and the world the reality.

What is going on now is manipulation to delay the will of the people. They did not carry guns that day. They were pushed to pick up guns after this day. The outcome of the survey of Rev. Cardinal Tumi is another reality of the people's will. That is why we believe he died for.

10 years today, no solution, no peace, because they want you or me to talk their cosmetic solution.

They used money and positions in Yaounde to corrupt the weak and greedy sons and daughters of the nosoians.

No number of guns will solve the



situation in NOSO, and no amount of propaganda, bribery, corruption, or the award of powerless positions to corrupters will stop the will of the

people. You can only delay it, but you will never destroy it.

@breakingnews



SOUTHERN CAMEROONIANS, AMBAZONIANS WANT TOTAL SEPARATION FROM LRC

WHAT SOUTHERN CAMEROONIANS/AMBAZONIANS/ANGLOPHONES/NW-SW) WANT.

Hypocrisy is when la République du Cameroun and some brainwashed agents say "Anglophones " don't know what they want.

We want our sovereignty over our territory as an independent country, which was granted independence by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1608 of 21-04-1961.

We want our IDENTITY, OUR CULTURAL HERITAGE back

We want our own statehood: Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons/Ambazonia

We want ABSOLUTE SEPARATION (Cardinal Tumi survey, over 69% want absolute separation

*We're a people and want to manage our own affairs. Yes, we did it before 1953-1961 (Endeley, Foncha). We conducted our own democratic

elections where opposition won, and power was peacefully transferred, unlike in la République du Cameroun We want la République du Cameroun to pull out from Southern Cameroons to its boundaries at independence on January 1st 1960. Note the territorial integrity and sovereignty of la République du Cameroun ends at her boundaries at independence on January 1st 1960.

Southern Cameroons is a distinct nation with internationally recognized boundaries. There're TWO AND DIVISIBLE CAMEROONS, and our attempt to live together has FAILED, and now, it's time to part ways.

Thanks UN
September 30th 2026



UNITY CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF IT IS WITH THE SPIRIT

LRC UNITY WITH THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS FAILED EVEN FROM DAY ONE BECAUSE IT WAS CONCEIVED WITH FALSEHOOD IN MIND AND THEREFORE WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

Our struggle has succeeded to this level because Dr Sako refused to force or convince anybody or group to join the Interim Government. The IG is not Dr Sako's creation, and so he had no right to alter it the way it was set up by the Ambazonian people. So, he could not do anything to submit to the demands of those who were demanding unity. But he kept the doors wide open for anybody who decided to come in and join the team. However, he stubbornly, and rightfully so, refused to succumb to the pressure mounted by fortune seekers to deviate from the goals and objectives set by the Ambazonian people as to how the struggle should be prosecuted.

THE AMBA PEACE PLAN (APP)

The Amba Peace Plan brought about the County-by-County and LGA-by-LGA system, which was one perfect way in the Devolution of Power on which every democratic system is built. Again, we could see through this APP that both the defence and civilians as entities quickly understood the advantages of belonging to one's LGA even if born or currently residing in another. That is why the National Drafting Exercise was always successful. People paid because they knew they were paying for their ancestral homeland and then Ambazonia. If this drafting was to be physically conducted inside Ambazonia itself with the total participation of those citizens on GZ, it would have been ten times more successful even if indigenes resided elsewhere. Just as the name indicates and as part of the APP strategy, it was truly peaceful, and people have only themselves to blame for not raising enough money for the wartime projects. Unfortunately, those who never participated in the building of their LGAs never understood that they were missing a golden opportunity to be part of the building process of their own ancestral homes. That is why most were very ignorant of what was going on in the LGAs and then would erroneously accuse the IG of misappropriation of funds. As a member and active participant in my LGA matters, it baffles me all the time why people would accuse the IG of such things when every dime belonging to the LGAs was used by the LGA executives and mostly in very

transparent ways. So when FM No Pity complained of not having seen any money since the drafting exercise ended, it was simply due to ignorance on his part since he had never taken time to understand what was going on in his own LGA. All he had to do was ask his chairperson about that. Even if the National Treasury was keeping some LGA or County money, according to the Treasurer, the money was there whenever the County or LGA requested it. For various reasons, Counties or LGAs were not in a hurry to retrieve their money except they had immediate projects to finance.

So, this issue of FM No Pity complaining about not having seen any money since the end of the drafting exercise is probably what made him think that creating a united force would make things better. But unfortunately, he miscalculated almost every step of the way. The key to understanding unity in the Ambazonian context is to be part of your LGA. The LGA is the bedrock of the devolution of power in any truly democratic society. Anybody talking of dictatorship where there are active political units like the LGAs does not know what democracy is. One LGA might not seem to be powerful enough to decide anything, but put all together it is more powerful like the central government itself! We are in the process of building a democracy, and I see that people are instead more interested in the leadership in Buea than their LGAs. Those who think like that don't understand real democracy. In Ambazonia the power of the country will be controlled by Mezam, Victoria, Kumba, Mamfe Bui and any other city that works hard enough to build its city's economy.

And the officials in charge of the local government in these places will set the tone of Ambazonian politics and economy. But what I see is that people are still under the spell of LRC, believing that a centralized administration is how the country should be governed, even though they ironically claim that they want a democracy. But they cannot want a powerful central government with a weak local government and yet still talk of a democratic government. Then why are they struggling to leave LRC? Talking about power, the military

component in the struggle seems to be somewhat not so powerful now and disjointed but it is just a temporal situation since we are in a war guerilla war with LRC. Even so, in its present dispensation, it has proven to be very lethal and strategically more devastating to LRC than a unified force. Through its LGA-by-LGA strategy, according to the APP, we have forced the LRC military to thinly spread itself over our territory, and this way has not been able to crush our defence forces despite their superior numbers and weaponry. The way it has gone since we began, any other strategy might be a doom for our defence forces. But, unfortunately, people like Chris Anu, Ayaba Cho Lucas, Akwanga Ebenezer, FM Gen No Pity, and others have brought in this unity nightmare doctrine. Whether intentionally or by accident, and suspiciously welcomed by LRC, we have seen that a single insignificant effort to organize an attack against an ARF camp has almost wiped out everybody there. Imagine what the state of our defences would be after three or four such attacks by LRC forces. But these are the same ARF forces which, a short while ago and even if ill-prepared, and not yet exposed to the newly-hatched doctrine of "UNITY" by the above-mentioned shady characters, these guys have been invincible to LRC for almost five years now. This does not look good.

So the only solution to this horribly conceived unity trap set to wipe out our defence forces is to improve on the APP LGA by LGA strategy. It's simple and almost cost-free to implement. In its present state, any improvement strategy by our fighters will be a devastating blow to any LRC attack. It's simple to understand. First, it redefines the term UNITY because it transforms unity from a physical concept into a spiritual one. We all understand that the Unity with LRC failed from day one because it was conceived to be a physical union where all power is centralized in Yaounde, and people are forced to respect whatever laws were put to maintain it. But unity in spirit does not need brute force to respect it. We unite because we want to and like to. In the situation where we find ourselves every LGA will be equipped with intractable satellite phone device to communicate with all LGAs with

which they share borders. This way, from every angle where the enemy wants to cross through one LGA and launch an attack against another, the targeted LGA will be notified well in advance, and so if the LGA through which the enemy is trying to pass cannot even stop the enemy, the saying TO BE WARNED IS TO BE PREPARED will come true, as the targeted LGA will be as well prepared as it can. And the benefits of such a strategy do not end there because the enemy will be trapped because in a retreat, it has to engage in another battle with other LGAs, whether it succeeded in its initial mission or not. Lastly, I will not end this posting without commenting on the drama we witnessed when these two rogues, Ayaba and Akwanga, used proceeds from the kidnapping they have been organizing all over Ambazonia to pay for flight and accommodation to go to Ireland to sign something called a treaty. Who do they actually have as followers behind them that makes it necessary to sign a treaty between these two? This is a complete joke and a mockery of our struggle. After the Ambazonian people, in supporting the APP, have set up the LGA-by-LGA strategy and softened the ground, these two jokers have come up with another diabolic plan to destabilize the struggle by trying to hoodwink some gullible Ambazonians into believing that a unity treaty has been achieved. Who are the people they are unifying in the first place, and for what reason? The Ambazonians are solidly behind the Interim Government, and if that is not unity, then I don't know what that is. But given their track record, who among these two crooks will want to be a junior partner to the other? As I said, unity must not be physical. Unity in Spirit is always stronger and more durable than physical unity.

@Jonathan Ngwa

Editorial comment:

We are no longer with an interim government; we are a full-fledged government of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons, Ambazonia, with the incorruptible, focused, results-oriented Dr Samuel Ikome Sako, the President. This government is currently on the diplomatic offensive to restore the state of Ambazonia.

MUST READ: JUA-AHIDJO TUG-OF-WAR

Throughout the 1960s, the idea of an 'Ambazonia Republic' circulated among members of the Buea Mountain Club. Chief Ewusi, the Club chair, was even taken to Yaounde and interrogated on this subject. Ahidjo's secret police in Ambazonia (the Southern Cameroons) busied itself churning out and dispatching to him, through his on-the-spot Camerounese Inspecteur, intelligence reports styled 'rapports trimestriels de synthase' (quarterly intelligence digest). In the eyes of Ahidjo, Jua's Government had become "something of a monster, harassing his central Government, condoning and exerting centrifugal forces in the Federation."

Ahidjo was particularly piqued by what became known as the Ndifor Case, 1966. That case clearly demonstrated that if challenged, even militarily, Ambazonia was capable of giving an appropriate response. Police Inspector Ndifor, as procurement officer, had ordered arms through the CDC on behalf of the Government of Ambazonia for use by the state's Police. Ahidjo probably thought there was a secessionist bid in the making. A month or so after unification, he had established a military tribunal in Buea and Sandhurst-trained Captain Robert Mbu, a citizen of Ambazonia, was its military prosecutor. Acting on orders from Mr. Sadou Daoudou the Federal Minister of Armed Forces, himself acting on instructions from Ahidjo, Captain Mbu had Inspector Ndifor arrested. Ndifor was arraigned before the military tribunal for 'possession of arms'. The tribunal was composed of an English expatriate judicial officer. Magistrate Wyatt, and two soldiers sitting as assessors. At the conclusion of the trial, the tribunal found the accused not guilty and accordingly acquitted him. Ahidjo saw a conspiracy in this court decision and thought the acquittal was unmerited. He ordered his soldiers, garrisoned in Buea, to capture Ndifor. Special Branch (Ambazonia Intelligence Service) informed Jua that Ahidjo had ordered the abduction of Ndifor despite his acquittal by Ahidjo's own military tribunal. The rule of law was being flouted and the liberty of a citizen of Ambazonia was at stake. Jua at once summoned a crisis cabinet meeting, which discussed the matter and then sent for the state's Commissioner of Police, Mr. Michael Ntune. The Prime Minister told him, "My Government decides that you resist to the last man the planned abduction of Inspector Ndifor." Back at Police Headquarters, Mr. Michael Ntune summoned two tested Senior Superintendents of Police, Agbor and Shiyntum, briefed them and entrusted the mission to them. Agbor and Shiyntum were the ablest and most daring officers of police ever, and even in his lifetime, Paxson Agbor was already a legend for feats of skill, strength, courage and valour. In the Ndifor Case, he and Shiyntum lived up to their reputation as skilful and brave officers. **They got battle-ready, a detachment of the state's Mobile Wing Police, famed for bravery, ingenuity, mobility and effectiveness.**

The two Officers of Police devised a 'battle' plan and tactically deployed the Wing in wait for the 'enemy'. Buea was tense but ready for a showdown with Yaounde. Paxson Agbor and his men secured the surrender of Ahidjo's Camerounese soldiers near the Buea Clerks' Quarters without firing a single shot. It was a most edifying story of wit and bravery. This was a clear indication of the extent to which Ambazonia was prepared to go to defend itself and its interests given the right leadership, which Jua ably provided at that time. This incident further endeared Jua to the people of the state. He was affectionately called simply by the Kom word of endearment, 'Bobé'. But the incident also sealed his fate as Prime Minister and was a contributory factor to the somewhat suspect circumstances of his death a few years later. Moreover, that was not the end of the Ndifor saga. Ahidjo soon dispatched a strong 4-man delegation of his Camcrounese Ministers to Buea to see the Prime Minister. The delegation, the composition of which was very significant, was made up of Mr. Happi, Délégué Général à la Sûreté Nationale; Mr. Sabbal Lecco, Ministre de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux; Mr. Enoch Kwayeb, Ministre de l'Administration Territoriale; and Mr. Sadou Daoudou, Ministre des Forces Armées. The delegation had a long audience with the Prime Minister, forced the case back to the military tribunal, and pressured it into convicting Ndifor and sentencing him to four years' imprisonment. Magistrate Wyatt could not stomach this travesty of justice and resigned his appointment in protest. Jua was scandalized. He had thought the tribunal would still acquit Ndifor since the facts of the case were the same and there was no new evidence. But he had not reckoned with Ahidjo's practice of always interfering with even the ordinary courts and of using the soldiers who constitute the military tribunal as cat's-paw. Ahidjo never forgave Jua for what he must have considered the latter's affront to him. He accused Jua of keeping a private army and called on him to disband it. To Ahidjo, the Mobile Wing Police was simply Buea's army in disguise. Jua had a ready answer for Ahidjo. He refused to disband the Wing. He pointed out that the state's Police, responsible for the maintenance of internal security within the state, was constitutionally established and was responsible to the Prime Minister. Jua further argued that if the Mobile Wing Police is a private army, then the Camerounese gendarmerie and Ahidjo's Garde republicans (his praetorian guard composed entirely of his northern tribesmen) answered more to the description of a private army, and Ahidjo needed to set the example by disbanding them first. Ahidjo was not amused. In January 1968, Ahidjo, in complete disregard of the constitutional conventions of Ambazonia, appointed Muna to replace Jua as Prime Minister in Buea. Then in October 1968, he signed a decree placing Ambazonian Police Force under his direct authority, in

flagrant violation of the constitution of the federated state. In a continuing effort to eliminate all reality of the autonomy of Ambazonia, in 1970 Ahidjo 'federalized' Ambazonian Police Force, that is to say, he fused it into the Camerounese police force known as 'Surete Nationale'. Meanwhile, the able and distinguished Speaker of the state House of Assembly, the Honourable Mr. P.M. Kale, the well-respected elder statesman of Ambazonia, suddenly passed away in August 1966. He was given a befitting state funeral with pomp and circumstance, including full police honours. The state's Police led the slow and forlorn funeral march to Buea Town, where he was interred in the yard of his house. Two months later, in October 1966, an incident occurred, illustrative of Jua's determination to defend the territorial integrity of Ambazonia. On 1 October 1966, Mr Emmanuel Epie, Editor of the Cameroon Mirror, published a lead story captioned '**Federal Regions May be Re-carved**'. The paper stated that Ahidjo planned to re-carve administrative regions in such a way that the result would be the extinction of Ambazonia as a distinct and separate cultural, political, and legal unit. According to the report, Ambazonia would be cut up into several parts, each of which would then be fused into the region in the Republic closest to it. The planned reconfiguration was to look something like this. As part of Region du Littoral, Victoria Division would be incorporated into departement du Wouri and Kumba Division would be merged with departement du Moungo. As part of Region de l'Ouest, Mamfe Division would be swallowed up by departement de la Menoua, and Bamenda and Wum Divisions would be fused with departement de la Mifi. As part of Region du Nord, Nkambe Division would be integrated into departement du Banyo. Jua's reaction to this alarming news was swift and robust. In a statement issued to the press, he declared: "It must be emphasized that the federal Republic of Cameroon is a federation of two states with different backgrounds, cultures and traditions; the present arrangement was in fact envisaged as the most ideal solution to reunification ... Any exercise, therefore, that is designed to alter this arrangement ... will clearly alter the basis on which the entire federation rests and will throw our present system of government into complete disarray ... It is equally clear that since ours is a democratic republic a matter of far-reaching significance and consequences cannot be conceived and executed in secret without the full knowledge and concurrence of the people of West Cameroon through their accredited representatives, to wit, the West Cameroon Government." Ahidjo's rejoinder was not long in coming. He denied any conspiracy to absorb Ambazonia, and said there was a single Cameroon, its citizens having the same rights and duties. Then he added, significantly, "After the people of West Cameroon



massively voted in favour of reunification and not for federation, after reunification itself we freely estimated that it was necessary to create a federation between the two states, and to create federal institutions. But that does not permit us to say that there are two Cameroonian nations." Of course, true to his character Ahidjo was lying and misrepresenting the facts; it is beyond peradventure that Ambazonia voted for independence first and foremost and, as an eventuality, for political association in a federal union, and that Ambazonia and Cameroun Republic are two territories, two countries, and two nations. There was no such thing as voting in favour of 'reunification'. That term does not appear in any UN records bearing on the plebiscite. Even at the Fouban meeting the welcoming banner that hung across the hall exclaimed, 'vivre le Cameroun unifié!' and not 'vive le Cameroun reunifies' Furthermore, there was no such option in the plebiscite as 'reunification'. The framers of the plebiscite questions used the term 'to join'. By common agreement between Ambazonia and Cameroun Republic, well before the plebiscite, that expression was understood to mean 'to federate'. Both parties committed themselves to a federal form of political association. Statements by government ministers in the Cameroon Times newspaper and the contents of the UN-sanctioned official campaign pamphlet, The Two Alternatives, informed the electorate that 'to join' meant 'to federate' and the electorate went to the polls with that in mind. The people of Ambazonia therefore voted in favour of independence and federal political association, and not for so-called 'reunification' (whatever that meant). 'Reunification' is not a legal term of art but a mere self-serving political slogan used by Ahidjo, aware that terminology preconditions thinking and perception. In fact, the term was never used during the plebiscite campaigns, even as a piece of political sloganeering. The political expression that was sometimes used during the plebiscite politicking was 'unification'. Even then, it appeared to have been used only by the pro-Cameroun Republic campaigners in opposition to

'integration', a term that was sometimes used by the pro-Nigeria campaigners. Whatever the case, Jua had made his point. There could be no question of a unilateral alteration of the well-known frontier between the two component states of the informal federation without the concurrence of the people of Ambazonia acting through their democratically elected Government. It was clearly implied in Jua's press statement that such concurrence would not be forthcoming as that would alter the very basis of the federal association, albeit informal, and put the federation itself asunder. As a reaction to Jua's unshakable stand, however, Ahidjo moved in 1969 to further strengthen 'territorial administration', that is, limit still further whatever autonomy Ambazonia still had left. Ahidjo increased the power exercisable by the 'prefets' and the 'inspecteurs'. The extensive powers they had included the power: to order the torture of individuals as a means of forcing compliance with their every command; to order the indefinite detention of persons, such order not subject to inquiry by any court of law; to order the confiscation of people's property, such order not also subject to question by any court of law; and to order the suspension of freedom of the press, of expression, of information, of movement (of persons and goods), and of assembly and association, without due process of law. The 'prefets' and 'gouverneurs' continue to enjoy these arbitrary powers to this day, unchecked neither by law nor morality. Jua s headaches with Ahidjo were not over yet. In December 1966, the Cameroun Republic army carried out a pogrom in Ambazonia. History records the organized mass killing as the Tombel Massacre. Fleeing relentless repression in their native Cameroun Republic, thousands of Bamileke refugees and so-called 'terrorists' had sought asylum in the safety of Ambazonia and were given sanctuary as migrants. These Bamileke tribesmen settled principally in Victoria, Tiko, Bamenda, Kumba and Tombel. In Tombel they acquired pieces of land (some say dubiously), laid doubtful claim to others, and took control of petty trading in the area.

Cont. p9

MUST READ: JUA-AHIDJO TUG-OF-WAR

Cont. from p8

The land issue was particularly critical for one reason. Within Cameroun Republic itself the land-pressed Bamileke tribe had already expanded from their native Region de l'Ouest southwards into Region de Littoral, colliding with and provoking a lot of anger and resentment among the aboriginal Sawa people of that region. The Bamileke were now seen as insensitively determined to expand from the Manengouba/Loum district in Cameroun Republic westward across the border into Bakossiland in Ambazonia. The people of Bakossiland resented this 'invasion by foreigners' and tension began to mount between the two communities.

Shortly before Christmas 1966, Bamileke terrorists operating from their bases across the border in Cameroun Republic of Cameroon slipped into Tombel and cowardly shot dead four defenceless Bakossis. The Bakossi retaliated by venting their anger on resident Bamileke. There were two or three casualties and some property was also damaged. A civilized government would have called for calm, given police protection to the two communities, ordered a commission of inquiry, and arrested and prosecuted the culprits. But the Yaounde regime was not a civilized government. It ordered its troops from Loum across the border. "Tombel must be destroyed". That seems to have been the order given to the army. And Tombel was indeed destroyed. The Ahidjo government hoped thereby to force so-called Bamileke 'maquisards' out of their presumed hiding place in the hills of this part of Ambazonia by a show of military power in the locality, and also to teach the local people a lesson for harbouring the Bamileke in the first place irrespective of the cause of the unrest.

Ahidjo's soldiers opened fire against the unarmed Bakossi people. Tombel wept. Houses and other property were destroyed. People were abducted from their homes and mercilessly tortured. Blood flowed. Two hundred and thirty-six (236) Bakossi men, women and children were massacred. Another one hundred and forty-three (143) were abducted and transported, under inhuman conditions, to Yaounde and 'tried' by a military tribunal for 'subversion and the dissemination of false news'. Seventeen were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad. Seventy-five were sentenced to life and ten to 10 years' 'detention', in various detention camps in the Republic. Those so jailed were in effect

sentenced to slow death, given the very cruel and life-threatening conditions under which prisoners were held in those camps. Four people were each sentenced to 2 years in jail. One man died during the trial, and 36 persons were discharged. In all, about 330 Bakossi people were killed by the Ahidjo dictatorship. An unknown number were incapacitated as a result of torture, and a further unknown number suffered psychological trauma. Few are the Bakossi families that were not affected, in one way or another, by this massacre.

This tragedy was all the more revolting as only six years earlier, in 1961 Cameroun Republic violated on several occasions and with impunity the territorial integrity of Ambazonia. For example, a combined French and Camerounese force led by French officers illegally crossed Ambazonia frontier on 8 August 1961 and massacred twelve defenceless CDC workers (by mistake, it was said) at Ebubu Village near Tombel.

Later, another contingent of Franco-Camerounese troops also crossed the frontier into Bamenda, raided houses and killed several persons in the process. In both cases, the excuse was that the soldiers were in pursuit of UPC terrorists who had found sanctuary in Ambazonia.

"Maurice Delauncy, futur ambassadeur au Gabon, commandant de la région insurgée, est un partisan de la manière forte, n'hésitant pas à violer l'intégrité du Cameroun britannique tout proche, où se trouve le siège de l'UPC. Il était particulièrement tentant, explique-t-il, d'essayer de détruire tin chancre situe a noire porte d'oit venaient le ravitaillaient en armes et en munitions et toutes les consignes et instructions distinctes aux maquisards pour réaliser les actes de terrorisme ... Par une belle unit, quelques homines décidés, frangiis et camerounais ... franchirent donc la frontière britannique, arrivèrent a Bamenda, pénétrèrent au siège du 'UPC, incendièrent l 'ensemble des bâillements, mirent hors d'état de nuire quelques responsables du parti. Mouniie, l'un des chefs, conclut : « Vadministrates français, n'étaient malheureusement pas présents ce jour-là."

Little was it known at that time that these massacres were a foretaste of Cameroun Republic's addiction to bloodletting. Soon, Ambazonians (Southern Cameroons citizens) who travelled to or through Cameroun Republic began giving horrid accounts of people's heads sadistically decapitated by Franco-Camerounese troops and

gruesomely displayed on stakes along the roads in that country, from Loum to Mbouda, as a dreadful warning to locals to desist from giving aid and comfort to 'maquisards'. But few were those who imagined the level of depravity, brutality and barbarism of those troops until they started visiting their cruel atrocities upon the people of Ambazonia. Little was it then known that an attempt would be made in the Republic of Cameroon to assassinate Mr. J. N. Foncha, the Prime Minister of Ambazonia, and that Zacharia Abendong, MP in Buea, would be killed in that botched Foncha assassination attempt.

In January 1968, the vindictive Ahidjo took his sweet revenge on Jua. In that month of that year, Ahidjo replaced Jua with Muna as the Prime Minister of West Cameroon, much to the universal consternation and chagrin in Ambazonia. The people of Ambazonia were devastated. For most of them Muna's appointment was nothing short of a coup d'etat and an act of provocation. The common classification of Ambazonian politicians was into those who stood up for the interests of the state and those who were considered sell-outs. The people of Ambazonia lionized Augustine Ngom Jua and Nzo Ekahah-Nghaky as exponents of the state's autonomy. They angrily referred to Solomon Tandeng Muna and Emmanuel Tabi Egbe as Ahidjo's hatchet men and as having sold out to Cameroun Republic. And well might they have so considered Muna and Egbe.

Muna's government in Buea was characterized by his espousal of 'centralist federalism', indistinguishable from Ahidjo's nonsensical 'unitary federalism'. It leaned heavily eastwards, towards Cameroun Republic, and was perceived by political watchers as a mere agency of Ahidjo's dictatorship. By mid-1965 Muna had ceased being a member of the state legislature in Buea. At the time of his appointment as Ambazonia's Prime Minister in January 1968 he was not even one of the thirty-seven elected members of the state House of Assembly. Since Muna owed his premiership entirely to Ahidjo he was of course beholden to him. He and his government were accountable to Ahidjo personally and not to the people of Ambazonia.

It was not long before Muna incurred the displeasure of Ahidjo. This came about as a result of a little incident in London involving the detention for a few hours of Wali Muna for entry into the UK without a visa. When Muna got

word of his son's detention, he had him released through the intervention of a British friend of his, Anthony Steele, chairman of the Anglo-Cameroon Society in London. The Guardian newspaper of 7 July 1969 reported the detention under the heading, 'African Prime Minister's son not allowed in Britain.' In the story, the London paper referred to Anthony Steele as the Ambassador of Ambazonia in the UK. Ambazonia had an ambassador accredited to the Court of St James? Ahidjo went berserk. And he lost no time in conveying his rage to Muna, accusing him of securing the release of his son "without using the official channel", that is, without going through him, Ahidjo.

Now, Jua took his humiliation by Ahidjo with equanimity. He was not through yet with his criticism of Ahidjo's iron-fisted rule. He would openly cross swords with him again in 1975. During the Douala jamboree of the Union Nationale Camerounaise, parti unique, Ahidjo pretended, Caesar-like, that he was not interested in again appointing himself the presidential 'candidate' for the habitual one-horse presidential 'race' choreographed every five years. His party cadres, both high and low, pleaded and pleaded with him to go back on his decision. They insisted that Ahidjo should 'accept' to be the presidential candidate. Jua then wondered aloud what all the fuss was about. He indicated that he, Ngom Jua, was able, willing, and ready to assume the high office of Head of State. As far as Ahidjo was concerned, this was blatant effrontery, if not subversion. From that moment, Jua became, to all intents and purposes, a 'dead man walking'.

There was one nagging problem of capital importance to the autonomy of Ambazonia. It concerned the revenue of the state. Jua boldly made efforts to resolve this problem. A gaping lacuna in Ahidjo's federal constitution was that the principle of revenue allocation was not included in its provisions. In other words, no provision was made for revenue sharing between federal and state governments. This was deliberate. The biggest sources of Ambazonia's revenue were customs and excise duty and export of cash crops.

By order of Ahidjo all the revenue from these critical sources went entirely and directly into the coffers of the federal government in Yaounde. For example, Ambazonian taxes amounted to FCFA 418 million and licenses 125 million in the 1966-67 fiscal year, taxes 647 million and licenses 130 million in the 1968-69 fiscal year. This money

went to Yaounde. Ambazonia was therefore deprived of its main sources of revenue. As a result, Buea depended on Yaounde to subsidize its budget. Jua requested the federal government for there to be a negotiated permanent system of revenue allocation, a fixed and secure source of revenue. Ahidjo refused, and he also refused to allow the government of Ambazonia any significant financial autonomy.

Jua then tried to set up a mechanism for auto-financing. He described as "a hazardous adventure" the system by which Ahidjo granted an annual subsidy to cover the budgeted expenditures of Ambazonia to make up the deficit over income as " a hazardous adventure ", since Ambazonian government could not tell in advance the amount which it would please Ahidjo to make available to it. This was a system deliberately created by Ahidjo. Its sinister objective was to cast Ambazonia in the mould of a beggar and to leave its government at the mercy of Ahidjo. "These ad hoc subsidies are thoroughly unsatisfactory", lamented in 1966 the Hon. P.M. Kemcha, who was then both Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Ambazonia.

Jua wondered aloud: "How can a State develop by itself according to its priorities if it cannot know how much it has at its disposal?" He then proposed to Ahidjo that there be set up a Joint Allocation Committee to decide in a permanent manner the sharing out of public revenue between the component governments of the Federation. "Otherwise," he added, "the [Southern Cameroons] Government would not be able to hold out for long as a real government, taking decisions itself in areas over which it enjoys sovereignty."

This was precisely the level to which Ahidjo wanted to reduce Ambazonia. So, he rejected Jua's proposal. He was bent on inducing a dependency syndrome in Ambazonia, on weakening the government of Ambazonia and on promoting the fiction that Ambazonia could not survive without the Republic. He was out to kill the government of Ambazonia as a real government. Perversely, Ahidjo would in 1972 turn around and advance Ambazonia's alleged poverty as one of the reasons for his dictatorial scrapping of the Federation and his formal annexation of Ambazonia.

Culled and edited in parts from “Imperialist politics in Cameroon: Resistance & the inception of the restoration of the statehood of the Southern Cameroons” by Carlson Anyangwe (2008) pp 60 - 70.

The New York Times

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 1960

Britain to Post Troops
In Southern Cameroons

Special to The New York Times.
LONDON, July 13—The Colonial Office announced today that British troops would be stationed temporarily in the Southern Cameroons pending settlement of the territory's future by a plebiscite scheduled Feb. 11, 1961.

"This decision is in no way connected with events in the Congo," the Colonial Office statement added.

Britain announced May 19 that Nigerian troops stationed in the Southern Cameroons would be withdrawn before Oct. 1, when Nigeria becomes independent, and that British forces might replace them.

The February plebiscite will determine whether the Cameroons, a United Nations trusteeship territory, will join Nigeria or Cameroon, which became independent Jan. 1.

Civil Aviation

570. An Air Service operates on Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday between Lagos and Tiko via Enugu, and connects alternately with Calabar or Port Harcourt and Calabar. They are operated by the Nigerian Airways Corporation using D.C.3s and De Havilland Herons respectively.

571. The fares are as follows:

	£	s.	d.
From Tiko to Calabar	5	8	0
From Tiko to Enugu	11	4	0
From Tiko to Frankfurt	164	3	0
From Tiko to Kano	29	10	0
From Tiko to Lagos	24	1	0
From Tiko to London	167	19	0
From Tiko to Port Harcourt	9	19	0
From Tiko to Rome	153	3	0

572. There is a bi-weekly air service linking Kano with Yola and Maiduguri. From Kano several airlines operate regular services to all parts of the world. In addition, the Northern Region Communications Flight operates frequent light aircraft flights on demand for official purposes, to Mubi and Beli serving Adamawa Trust Territory, and to Wukari and Takum, which are adjacent to Benue Trust Territory.

573. The following Airstrips have been constructed by Crop Culture (Aerial), Ltd., in the Southern Cameroons: Bota, Idenan, Ekoni, Lobe, Mbonge, Mukonye, N'Dian and Tombel. These Airstrips are used by Crop Culture (Aerial), Ltd., light aircraft.





1953 création de "Air Cameroon" par la CDC première compagnie aérienne avec des vols de Tiko - Londres. 1963 création de la 2ème compagnie CAT (Cameroon air transport) toujours à Tiko.

CAMEROON POST

CAM Meeting Holds Against Background Of Threats
* Calls on all educational institutions in Cameroon not to reopen if CEB decree is not signed

THE FEDERATION ISSUE

Mitterrand Instructs Biya To Reject Two-State Federation
* Suggests Army Intervention to Crush Anglophone Resistance

THE SO-CALLED COMMUNIQUE FROM SOUTH WEST CHIEFS AND ELITES

Chief Inoni Ephraim Declares Secession
Yaounde SWELA Chapter President, Chief John Agbor Tabi Fires Back

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE DU CAMEROUN
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

Référendum Constitutionnel du 20 mai 1972
Constitutional Referendum of 20 May 1972

OUI - YES

West Cameroon Police ,Police College 1966





Southern Cameroons Police Force.
When policemen used to be upright and competent. Not today's decadent, cesspool of professional racketeers.
M P Mola, S. A. Ngwenba is in the middle

MANKON STATE UNION

SOUTHERN CAMEROONS

MEMBERSHIP CARD

MOTTO- UNITY & ACTION

Name Marcus Fon Taku

Occupation Learning Carpenter

Address Mankon

Enrolment No 1243

Branch Home

Quarter New Mankon

Date Enrolled 4/4/62

Secretary [Signature] President [Signature]

G. C. I. PRESS MINION BAMENDA

Egbe M. Ntune J.Y K'kongson
W.C.P/ASP W.C.P/SP W.C.P.M.W/ASP

W.C.P = West Cameroon Police
W.C.P.M.W= West Cameroon Police Mobile Wing



WEST CAMEROON FOOTBALL TEAM VS CHINA AT THE HOLFORT STADIUM IN TIKO 1972



Kesha Kena May 20 at 4:01 AM

West Cameroon vs China at the Holfort Stadium Tiko. June 1972. Chinese Premier greeting West Cameroon players as the newly appointed Governor of SW Province Enow Tanjong, looks on.

Players from right to left: Njipe (Prisons Buea), third from right - Chief Humphrey Mosenge (Prisons Buea); 5th from right Etoundi (CDC Tiko), 8th Kulu (CDC Tiko).

Nobody is safe in Cameroon: EITHER CAMEROON ENDS THIS CONFLICT—OR THIS CONFLICT WILL END CAMEROON

A constitutional crisis requires a constitutional and political settlement—not endless bloodshed. Dialogue is necessary, but dialogue without a defined objective, genuine negotiation and enforceable constitutional reform will become another ceremony of speeches and photographs... And if every call for constitutional reform is answered with bullets, arrests, ghost towns or intimidation, what peaceful avenue remains for resolving legitimate grievances?

If politicians, traditional and religious leaders, historians, professors and other stakeholders refuse—or fail—to understand that bombs, guns and warfare cannot resolve a constitutional question, how can we expect separatist fighters and rank-and-file soldiers to understand this truth, lay down their weapons, and stop killing one another and innocent civilians? The images before us are not photographs of victory. They are portraits of collective failure: three civilians reportedly killed in Ekona, and three soldiers reportedly killed in Matuke. Six Cameroonian families are grieving. Six lives have been lost. What constitutional question did these deaths resolve? What political objective did they achieve? Who will be killed next?

Nobody is safe in Cameroon. Government officials cannot freely return to their villages because nobody is safe. Military personnel cannot walk freely through communities or relax in restaurants because nobody is safe. Separatist fighters cannot move openly through towns or sleep peacefully in their family homes because nobody is safe. During lockdowns and ghost towns, civilians cannot freely go to the market, hospital, farm—or sometimes even a nearby pit toilet—because nobody is safe. When public officials fear their own villages, soldiers fear restaurants, fighters fear their own homes, and civilians fear the road to the hospital, who can honestly claim to be winning this war? Who benefits from this catastrophic

insecurity, instability and criminality? Certainly not the soldiers being buried, the fighters dying in the bushes, the civilians murdered in their homes, the children kept out of school, or the families driven into poverty and exile. **A constitutional crisis requires a constitutional and political settlement—not endless bloodshed. Dialogue is necessary, but dialogue without a defined objective, genuine negotiation and enforceable constitutional reform will become another ceremony of speeches and photographs.** Cameroon’s authorities are under a moral and institutional obligation to call for immediate, inclusive negotiations that bring together the country’s sons and daughters—Government representatives, Anglophone leaders, separatist representatives, political parties, civil society, traditional authorities, women, young people and the diaspora. The objective must be clear: to negotiate and draft a genuinely federal Constitution that acknowledges Cameroon’s history and protects the distinct legal, educational, linguistic and cultural heritage of the North-West and South-West Regions while establishing a fair and workable relationship among all components of the country. Cameroon’s present constitutional instability has deep historical roots. The Constitution of 4 March 1960 was strongly influenced by the French constitutional model. It was followed by the 1961 Federal Constitution, the abolition of the federation in 1972 and repeated constitutional changes thereafter. This history cannot simply be



erased or suppressed by force. If the constitutional foundation is unstable, manipulated or repeatedly altered without sufficient national consent, how can political relationships built upon it remain stable? If trust is repeatedly violated, how can unity survive? If citizens experience corruption, injustice, poverty, unemployment and inequality, how long can the State expect coercion alone to preserve peace? **And if every call for constitutional reform is answered with bullets, arrests, ghost towns or intimidation, what peaceful avenue remains for resolving legitimate grievances?** The answer is becoming painfully obvious: there is no military solution. The only credible way forward is an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, confidence-building measures,

inclusive negotiations and a binding constitutional settlement accepted by the people. Federalism is not the destruction of Cameroon. Properly negotiated, it can be the constitutional instrument that saves Cameroon—by replacing domination with partnership, suspicion with guarantees and forced unity with voluntary coexistence. We must stop asking how many more soldiers, fighters and civilians must die before negotiations begin. We must ask why serious negotiations have not already begun. Either Cameroonians end this conflict now—or, through fear, silence and political failure, this conflict may eventually end the Cameroon we know. **ENOUGH BLOODSHED. LET CAMEROON NEGOTIATE ITS FUTURE.** *Dr. David Makongo*

The African Bar Association has not found a single article of the UN Charter, UN Resolution or the African Union Constitutive Act, nor any instrument of international law which gave the Republic of Cameroun jurisdiction over the Southern Cameroons

By reason of historical facts and accidents of modern history, the U.K. has a moral and decisive role to play in the urgent rescue of the brutalized but not seemingly vanquished people of Southern Cameroons. The African Bar Association is a willing party in the restoration of peace and the right to self-determination of the people of

Southern Cameroons. You can count on us for this. Our willingness to stand by the People of Southern Cameroons is based solely on Truth, Justice and the Rule of Law. The greatest shortcoming on the part of the UN is that while it adopted Resolution 1608(XV) calling for a tripartite conference to work out the terms of association between the British Southern

Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun, the UN never created any mechanism to monitor and report on the implementation of that Resolution. Consequently, the idea that the Southern Cameroons achieved independence on 1st October and then joined the Republic of Cameroun was an assumption, which turned out not to be true based on our findings.

Without the implementation of Resolutions 1608(XV) and the landmark Res. 1514, no union was achieved, no terms of the relationship were worked out, and the British Southern Cameroons became prey to Cameroun, even though Cameroun voted against union with the Southern Cameroons.



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